SUDAN’S NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT AND CIVIL WAR

CHARITY BUGA
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CHARITY BUGA
University of Nairobi
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
buga.charity@gmail.com

Abstract

The war in Sudan was caused by both economic and non-economic motives. It can be noted from this study that indeed, that war is caused by many factors. However, the most argued about cause of war is the economic agenda. For example, this study hypothetically argues that the economic agenda was a main cause of war in South Sudan. To begin with, the Government of Sudan was interested in the South due to the numerous oil deposits that are located there. That’s why, as observed by Prendergast, the Government of Sudan used helicopters and gunships to displace the southerners from oil rich areas. Consequently, any move towards self-determination would be uneconomical for the Government of Sudan. In addition, the Sudan war can also be described as a war of visitors as various Governments supported the two warring parties. The research was purely qualitative. Desktop literature review was conducted. Critical analysis of the literature was conducted.

Key words: Conflict, civil war, Sudan’s North-South

1. INTRODUCTION

Violent conflicts anywhere in the world are costly. This fact can be said of Sudan’s north-south conflict, which resulted into a fully-fledged armed civil war fought between Khartoum’s Government of Sudan army in the north and the dissident Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the South. While some analysts’ argue that there are no reliable figures to tabulate the human cost of Sudan’s 21 years old civil war, it is generally argued that the effects of Sudan’s civil war upon crops, property and vast amounts of natural resources have been devastating, resulting in the loss of millions of innocent lives.¹

Sudan’s victims of direct violence or related starvation and disease”² include half a million refugees that spilled into neighbouring countries and another estimated 4 million internally displaced people, “driven from their homes within Sudan - the largest such dislocation in the world today.”³ During the civil war, which was prosecuted “with stark brutality although the

¹ Douglas Johnson is one such analyst. See his, Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Oxford, James Currey, 2003, pp. 143-144
² Raphael Badal, Local Traditional structures in Sudan: a base for building civil society for the promotion of peace and reconciliation (LPF: Nairobi, 2006), p. 1
³ International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country (Brussels: ICG Press, 2002), p. 3
⁴ Ibid, pp. 3-4
government has usually carried out the worst abuse in the South, the international community “poured humanitarian relief [...] on a massive scale – billions of dollars.” But this humanitarian relief “barely addressed the symptoms and [did nothing] about the causes of the country’s suffering, [which included] religious intolerance, racial discrimination, rapacious resource extraction and elite domination.”

Although much of the international community increasingly recognises and appreciates the value of humanitarian aid in times of civil war, Anderson asserts that humanitarian relief on occasion could exacerbate instead of contributing towards the resolution of the conflict and promoting peace building. Anderson emphasises that “although NGOs do not generate conflicts, they sometimes contribute to and reinforce violence conflicts pre-existing in societies where they work.” According to Anderson, the negative impacts of humanitarian assistance comprise two basic types: the first result from the transfer of resources and the second involves what she calls, “the ethical message conveyed by the provision of assistance.”

Internationally renowned peace scholar, John Prendergast contends that this “critique often goes further and blames humanitarian agencies for not dealing with political roots of crises, a critique that overestimates agency mandates and their potential for addressing macro-political issues.” These critics argue that “donor governments are using humanitarian aid as a cover for a lack of political engagement.” It is against this background that this researcher endeavours to understand the role of humanitarian relief organisations in conflict, and how humanitarian relief aid inadvertently feeds conflicts by making more resources available to warring parties. This researcher further seeks to establish whether or not “the costs of the conflict to the international community are much higher than the humanitarian bills it has been paying.”

2. Statement of the Research Problem

During Sudan’s 21 years of civil war in the South, a unique phenomenon and continuum of humanitarian intervention developed. From what was initially a supply of emergency relief aid, a multi-billion corporate relief industry emerged to develop into an organized, formal and well-structured mechanism for social service delivery. There is no doubt that the emergency relief aid rendered saved many lives across Southern Sudan. With the end of the civil war in

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5 Ibid. p. 4
6 Ibid, p. 4
7 Ibid
9 Ibid.
13 Ibid, p. 8
14 Ibid. p. 25
15 International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country (Brussels: ICG Press, 2002), p. 6
Southern Sudan, which many acclaim to be Africa’s longest and intractable violent conflict, it would be interesting to find out what the role of humanitarian assistance played on the conflict in Southern Sudan.

3. Methodology
The research was purely qualitative. Desktop literature review was conducted. Critical analysis of the literature was conducted.

4. Causes and factors of the civil war: a survey
A common aspect of many wars has been conflict over access to scarce resources, such as minerals, food, land and trade routes. In certain wars, the primary objective of one or more of the parties was to acquire scarce resources in order to improve their economic well-being. This was the case with the military campaigns of the Mongols in the thirteenth century. With wars of liberation, such as the African National Congress’ struggle against the apartheid government of South Africa, economic emancipation of marginalised groups was a critical objective of many insurgent groups. Over the past decade, however, a worrying trend has emerged in the relationship between economics and armed conflict. This trend appears to have two dimensions.

First, valuable resources that are of economic value have been used to finance civil wars, such as to purchase arms, ammunition and military assistance. For example, Executive Outcomes, a former South African mercenary outfit, was granted mining concessions by the Angolan government in exchange for services rendered. In many cases valuable resources, which would have been critical to rebuilding the country in the aftermath of the war, have been used to barter for weapons. Second, a successful outcome of a war is no longer perceived as being the sole means for achieving economic benefits. Rather it has been argued that the perpetuation of war in certain African countries has become an alternative way of generating profits.

It has been alleged that where economic privileges and assets have been acquired in an armed conflict, either from control of the state or secured through illegal means, parties to the conflict tend to acquire vested interests in prolonging the conflict. The reason is that peace, democracy and accountability for human rights abuses could seriously undermine wartime economic interests. In addition, as with the Angolan, Liberian and DRC civil wars, outsiders motivated by economic agendas can intervene in, and perpetuate, armed conflicts. These outsiders include states, rebel groups, multinational corporations, mercenary outfits and entrepreneurs. They become involved in conflicts in order to enrich themselves though the exploitation of natural resources or via commercial ventures such as weapons trafficking.

War profiteering is not a new phenomenon. However, it has been argued that the extent to which commercial agendas are driving or perpetuating current violent conflict in Africa, and the profits that are being derived from these activities, are unprecedented. Critically, these economic agendas provide significant obstacles to the resolution of many conflicts and will prevent sustainable processes of peace-making and peace-building from being achieved.
4.1 Economics of conflict

An agenda is a plan or program, which is a phenomenon that has a distinct aim or motive. Hence, an economic agenda entails a plan or intention to derive financial benefits from a particular situation. In a war, economic agendas can be divided into two broad categories, namely economic agendas that are related to the causes of war, and economic agendas that contribute to the perpetuation of war. There is no clear boundary between these two categories as there can be a degree of overlap, particularly with respect to greed.

In terms of the first category, wars often emerge out of attempts by political communities to improve their material well-being. Historically, many military campaigns have been launched in order to acquire valuable natural resources and/or strategic trading points. Examples include Spain’s conquest of the Americas and various wars during the critical era of state formation in Europe, namely between the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. In addition, economic grievances, such as socio-economic deprivation, and inequitable distribution of resources by the state amongst its citizens, can contribute to the outbreak of war. This was the case with the French and Russian revolutions, as well as many of the wars of national liberation in Africa.

In terms of the second category, wars can be perpetuated due to the presence of key individuals or groups who derive economic benefits from the war that would be negatively affected should the war be peacefully resolved. Consequently many of these individuals and groups devise and implement plans to prolong armed conflicts. These profit-making activities tend to be driven by greed and generally involve the exploitation of mineral rich areas, usually diamonds and oil, and commercial ventures such as weapons trafficking.

David Keen\(^{16}\), one of the only authors to provide a detailed definition of an economic agenda, interprets this phenomenon more broadly by claiming that the following seven categories constitute economic agendas\(^{17}\) namely 1) trade, 2) labour exploitation, 3) land and natural resources, 4) Benefits for the military, 5) looting and pillaging, 6) protection money, and 7) theft of aid supplies. Of trade, he noted that controlling or monopolising trade has been an important component of civil wars in Africa, where ‘forced markets’, rather than market forces, may determine the demand and supply of resources. War may cause price increases of certain commodities, and may make it easier to threaten or constrain trading rivals. Officials may profit by allowing government restrictions or sanctions on wartime trading to be breached; conflict may make it easier for warlords to avoid paying government taxes. Apparently, according to him, the factor of trade goes hand-in-wrist with labour exploitation. That in a time of war, where the rule of law is severely weakened, threatening individuals and communities with violence may force them to work cheaply or for free.


\(^{17}\) Ibid
On the third factor of land and natural resources, it has been observed that violent conflict often depopulate large areas. This in turn allows armed groups to claim land, water and mineral resources. Mineral rich areas are often intentionally targeted by armed forces for this very reason. A perfect example was observed in Kenya in the period immediately after the marred December 2007 General elections. Politico-ethnic induced conflict led to the internal displacement of over 300,000 people from their lands and homes. This was a perfect opportunity for the SDLF militants and other warlike establishments to occupy lands for the displaced. But in situation of armed conflicts, it is not difficult to disengage the conflict from its benefits for the military. In a war situation, the economic wellbeing of the armed forces is often drastically improved, as war often necessitates a larger budget and/or justifies a role in government. In addition, it may include higher salaries for senior military officers and/or seats on the boards of private companies.

Looting and pillaging in many situations of violent conflict is almost always prevalent. This is so because conflicts cause sections of the armed forces loot and pillage villages and towns in order to supplement military wages. Armed groups often engage in these activities in order to obtain supplies and money to purchase weapons. Closely linked to conflict is the need benefits gained from protection money. In situations of violent conflict, warlords, security personnel and criminal syndicates may offer ‘protection’ from violence to civilians, communities or companies in return for payment. This is so with the opportunities that abound, resulting into theft of aid supplies. In this case and during a war where there is large-scale suffering by civilians, foreign relief aid is often forthcoming. As food, medical and other essential supplies are often in short supply in these situations, stolen aid supplies can be sold for a substantial profit.

However, as Keen\textsuperscript{18} defines economic agendas broadly, he neglects to distinguish between actual economic agendas, namely planned or intended actions, and opportunistic spin-offs of armed conflicts. For example, looting/pillaging, protection money and theft of aid supplies are rent-seeking activities, but in most conflict situations they do not constitute a significant agenda or motive that would obstruct the peaceful resolution of armed conflicts.

The relationship between war and economic agendas may be discussed within the context of human rights issues, exposing alleged human rights abuses as a consequence of civil wars. Many of the publications provide policy recommendations. Examples include country or issue specific reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the US Department of State.\textsuperscript{19} For instance, according to an Amnesty International report that “tens of thousands of people have been terrorised into leaving their homes in Western Upper Nile since early 1999.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid
Government forces have used ground attacks, helicopter gunship and indiscriminate high-altitude bombardment to clear the local population from oil-rich areas."\(^{20}\)

Furthermore, in the case of Sudan it has been argued that foreign currency earned from oil exports has provided the government with the means to continue fighting a war against the SPLM. It has been alleged that the increase in oil exports was due to the revival of Sudan’s oil industry through the Greater Nile Oil Project, which is dominated by foreign oil companies. The biggest players in this initiative are the China National Petroleum Company, PETRONAS Carigali (Malaysia) and Talisman Energy (Canada). The Sudanese government has implemented divide and rule strategies, initiated the forced removal of communities, and allegedly committed gross human rights violations, all in an attempt to consolidate its control over oil resources. This has had the effect of exacerbating the armed conflict.\(^{21}\)

There is a vast array of publications on the privatisation of security, which is the employment and deployment of ‘mercenary’ forces in armed conflicts. These business entities have a significant economic interest in war and in its perpetuation as there are significant financial rewards to be had, either in cash or mineral concessions. Mercenaries (private armies) can be defined as “soldiers hired by a foreign government or rebel movement to contribute to the prosecution of armed conflict - whether directly by engaging in hostilities, or indirectly through training, logistics, intelligence or advisory services - and who do so outside the authority of the government and defence force of their own country."\(^{22}\)

In the literature, there are two schools of thought, namely those who support the use of private armies, and those that oppose them. The ‘support’ literature emphasises the technical and efficiency aspects of this phenomenon. It is claimed that private security firms have a distinct corporate character; they have used legitimate instruments to secure deals; and they have mainly supported recognised governments, avoiding unpalatable regimes. This literature set claims that coercion is often essential to breaking deadlocks and bringing opposing parties to the negotiation table. Private security firms are the solution for poor governments that lack the resources to field effective fighting forces, especially as the political and economic costs of peacekeeping continue to escalate. In short, this section of the literature implies that private security firms for the most part aim to resolve conflicts.\(^{23}\)

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4.2 Theoretical Analysis

Most of the theoretical literature in this area is drawn from research projects housed within institutions such as the World Bank and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), as well as international conferences. The main conferences to date have been “Economic Agendas in Civil Wars” held in Canada House, London, April 199924; and “The Economics of Political Violence”, held at the Center for International Studies, Princeton University, March 200025. This literature can be crudely divided into qualitative and quantitative approaches, with the greater volume of literature being qualitative. The common thread is that economic agendas are seen as a significant factor in current civil wars in Africa, and a major impediment to their resolution.

In terms of the qualitative literature three authors stand out, namely David Keen26, William Reno27, and Mark Duffield28. Keen argues that to have some understanding of violence in civil wars, one has to have some grasp of the economic dimension of armed conflict. From a general overview of war, Keen asserts that “war has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means. War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but the way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection.”29 He argues that in the context of civil wars, members of armed groups can benefit from looting and regimes can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to resources. Under these circumstances ending civil wars becomes difficult, and defeating the enemy may not be desirable,

“...as the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes. Analysts have tended to assume that war is the ‘end’ and abuse of civilians the ‘means’, it is important to consider the opposite possibility: that the end is to engage in abuse or crimes that bring immediate rewards, while the means is war and its perpetuation.”30

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24 This conference was hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of International Development of the United Kingdom, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Centre for International Studies at Oxford University, and the International Peace Academy
25 This conference was hosted by the Centre of International Studies and the World Bank Research Group
30 ibid
Keen\textsuperscript{31} distinguishes between two forms of economic violence, namely “top-down” and “bottom-up”. Top-down violence is mobilised by political leaders and entrepreneurs, and can be influenced by factors such as a weak state, an economic crisis, a strong threat to a regime and competition for valuable resources. Bottom-up violence is violence employed by citizens and/or low-ranking soldiers. It is fuelled by social and economic exclusion, the absence of a strong revolutionary organisation or ideology, and the belief that violence will go unpunished.\textsuperscript{32}

William Reno\textsuperscript{33}, through an analysis of the political economy of violence in “shadow states”\textsuperscript{34} argues that autocratic leaders stay in power by intentionally undermining state institutions and creating and enshrining patronage. Reno also asserts that in the context of civil war economic interests of belligerent groups may seriously impede the termination of conflict. The reason for this is that war may be used to control land, commercial activities, labour, take advantage of emergency relief supplies, and ensure the financial well-being and status of elites. Hence, belligerent parties may have vested interests in the continuation of conflicts.\textsuperscript{35} However, as Reno (2000) predominantly has anecdotal evidence to draw from, his analysis reveals that more qualitative research in this area is required.

Mark Duffield\textsuperscript{36} analyses the relationship between globalisation and protracted civil wars in developing countries, and provides a sound analysis of war economies. Duffield argues that globalisation has not contributed to civil war in a significant way, but has led to increased disparity and instability in the developing world, as well as the expansion and penetration of all forms of trans-border activity, particularly, highly criminalised war economies.\textsuperscript{37} As war economies are dependent on external markets, Duffield argues market regulation could potentially be a useful conflict resolution tool. Duffield calls for more research to be undertaken in this regard.

Recently, quantitative models have begun to emerge, mainly driven by research projects within the World Bank and PRIO. The World Bank’s project on the economics of civil wars, crime and violence, which is headed by Paul Collier, seeks to determine the following: the economic and political factors that increase the risk of civil war, terrorism, and violent crime; policies that are conducive to reducing these risks; and the socio-economic policy difference between post-conflict societies which have high levels of violence, and those societies without such problems.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Keen} ibid
\bibitem{Reno} ibid
\bibitem{Reno} Reno defines shadow states “as the product of personal rule, usually constructed behind the facade of de jure state sovereignty.”
\bibitem{Duffield} Mark Duffield, 2000. “Globalisation, Transborder Trade, and War Economies”, in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 69-90
\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid
\end{thebibliography}
In terms of civil war, this project has two specific foci. The first one is to investigate and analyse the economic causes and consequences of civil wars. Second, to study the inter-relationships between economic, political, and social variables as they affect the probability that civil war will occur as well as the duration and intensity of these wars. It is anticipated that these analyses will provide insights that will facilitate the generation of economic policies that will reduce the probability of war and reduce human suffering in post-conflict countries.  

The work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler appears to be amongst the most sophisticated. These scholars use a panel data set of conflict over the period 1960-1999 to examine the risk of civil war using logic regressions. The authors employ a set of rational choice models of rebellion that revolve around two contrasting motivations for rebellion, namely “greed” and “grievance”. The simple greed-rebellion model holds that rebellion will occur if it is financially profitable, provided rebel forces are able to evade, endure or repel assaults by government armed forces. The simple grievance model states that war will occur as a consequence of one or more grievances, such as inter-group hatred, political exclusion, and vengeance. Through an intensive statistical analysis, of the global pattern of large-scale conflict from 1965, Collier and Hoeffler found that the grievance models had low explanatory power, while greed models perform well. In fact, in another article Collier claims through statistical analyses that economic agendas appear to be central to the origins of many civil wars.

The models that Collier and Hoeffler construct and the conclusions they draw are thought-provoking and certainly challenge conventional wisdom. They are correct in arguing that the economic dimensions of civil war have been neglected. The political economy of rebel groups is a glaring gap in the literature. However, there are certain weaknesses with Collier and Hoeffler’s grievance model. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious hatreds are over-emphasised, while issues of governance, socio-economic deprivation and security concerns are not adequately accounted for. These omissions, if adequately addressed, could have significant implications for their analysis.

In terms of governance, the state’s lack of institutional capacity to manage ordinary political and social conflict is often a fundamental cause of armed conflict in Africa. That is when states do not have the resources and expertise to resolve disputes and grievances distribute resources equitably, manage competition and protect the rights of citizens, individuals and groups may resort to violence. Socio-economic conditions, with the exception of income distribution, are not included in the grievance model. According to Nathan, in African countries the risk of violence increases when poor socio-economic conditions suddenly

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40 Ibid
deteriorate even more; when government is corrupt and unresponsive to the needs of its people; and when poverty and unemployment are linked to an inequitable distribution of wealth.\footnote{Ibid}

The models also overlook external factors to civil wars. A number of rebellions have been initiated and/or sponsored by foreign governments. Indra de Soysa, who draws on Paul Collier extensively, examines the links between the scarcity of natural resources and civil conflict by utilising World Bank estimates of natural capital stock per capita for sixty-four countries. Essentially, de Soysa seeks to challenge the position that natural resource scarcity drives conflict. The results of de Soysa’s analysis suggest that the abundance of renewable resources among poor countries is more likely to lead to violence and to lower economic, human, and institutional development.

De Soysa further claims that the abundance of non-renewable resources is consistently associated with higher levels of conflict and lower levels of human and institutional development. According to de Soysa, the results support the argument that armed conflict is often driven by greed-motivated factors rather than grievance factors.\footnote{Indra de Soysa, 2000. “Natural Resources and Civil War: Shrinking Pie of Honey Pot?” presented at conference on the economics of political violence, Princeton University, 18-19 March 2000; Indra de Soysa, 2000. “The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?” in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 113-136.} However, de Soysa’s model does not take account of governance, socio-economic inequality, and inter-group rivalries in a significant manner.

4.3 Sudan’s North-South Conflict: a brief history

Like many colonial creations, Sudan amalgamated territory and peoples had never previously been a coherent entity. Much of northern Sudan is an arid desert, while the south has large areas of rain forests and swamps. Some places in the far north receive only a week of rain, while the far south can get nine months of rainfall. The experiences of those in north and south have often been as sharply different as Sudan’s climate and geography.

Many difficulties arise from the colonial legacy. When Sudan fell under the control of Britain and its quasi-protectorate\footnote{Britain became involved in Egyptian affairs in the 1870s but did not declare a protectorate over Egypt until 1914.} Egypt in 1898, a joint-authority government was formed. Britain took over management of southern Sudan, leaving the north under nominal Egyptian rule (largely as a nod to former Egyptian territorial claims). Britain developed a “Southern Policy”, the primary aim of which was to prevent economic integration of the two regions in order to curtail the north’s Arabic and Islamic influence.\footnote{Peter Woodward, “Sudan: War without End”, in Oliver Furley (ed.) Conflict in Africa (New York, 1995).} The British saw a distinct south as a buffer that could preserve English values and beliefs, such as Christianity, and eventually either be developed into a separate political entity or integrated into British East Africa.\footnote{Robert Collins, Shadows in the Grass (New Haven, 1983).} A Christian missionary presence was encouraged in the south, as were the English language and legal
traditions. The southern provinces were largely closed off to northern contact and increasingly isolated. With independence imminent, the northern elite commenced “Sudanisation”—replacing British officials with Sudanese nationals. Almost all colonial administrators were removed between June and November 1954. This massive infiltration of northerners into the government greatly alarmed southerners. In September 1956, the Legislative Assembly appointed a committee to draft a national constitution, only three of whose 46 members were southerners. The southern delegation walked out after its repeated calls for a federal constitution were outvoted.

Violent conflict broke out even before independence in January 1956. In 1955, as independence approached, southern apprehension led to riots and a bloody rebellion. After hearing rumours that they were to be disarmed and transferred to the north, soldiers from the army’s Southern Corps mutinied, and at least 300 people (mostly northerners) died. The mutineers who evaded imprisonment, fled into the bush or to the neighbouring countries. In November 1958, the army, led by General Ibrahim Abboud, seized power. The military regime suppressed opposition, imprisoning politicians, trade unionists, students and communists. Abboud also launched a controversial effort to accelerate “Islamisation” of the South through an aggressive proselytising campaign. His repression forced thousands of southerners into exile in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. These refugees formed opposition organisations, the most significant of which came to be known as the Sudan African National Union. It petitioned the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), arguing for self-determination and a peaceful solution to the southern Sudan problem.

While the Sudan African National Union was emerging as a political voice, a southern Sudanese military movement, the Anya-Nya (“snake poison”), composed mainly of former soldiers and policemen from the 1955 mutiny, materialised out of the bush. Feeling underrepresented and discriminated against, the southern civilian population supported Anya-Nya. General Abboud responded with a sweeping military campaign, and over half a million southerners fled as refugees. As the war intensified and the government refused to acknowledge its root cause was the lack of southern political and economic power, even the Sudan African National Union, which initially condemned the Anya-Nya’s violent tactics, organised guerrilla attacks. By 1963, there was full-fledged civil war.

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48 History of Sudan, Britain’s Southern Policy, p. 1.
49 Of the eight hundred posts granted by the Sudanese Public Service during this period, southerners received only six junior positions. Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa (London, 1999), p. 203.
A northern civilian uprising forced Abboud from power in October 1964, and the opportunity for peace looked more promising until a roundtable conference in Khartoum the next year failed to bring a political settlement. The war intensified and became dangerously internationalised, with increasing numbers of foreign powers supporting either the government or the Anya-Nya, and sometimes both. For example, in 1965 rebels from the Congo (DRC) provided Anya-Nya with arms. Israel became a key financier of Anya-Nya after the Six-Day War of June 1967 and shipped weapons captured from Egypt, hoping this would encourage the government to limit its assistance to Middle East nations.

Israel established a base in Uganda and began training and supporting Anya-Nya troops, who also relied on Ethiopia as a sanctuary. Khartoum responded to Israeli support for Anya-Nya by strengthening its alliance with Egypt. Other Muslim nations - the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - aided the war effort by providing arms, ammunition and funds. The government’s main financier, however, was the Soviet Union. Soviet aid increased dramatically after the Six-Day War, and in January 1968 Sudan and the Soviet Union signed a U. S. $100 million agreement. In 1969, General Jaafar al-Nimeiri came to power in a coup d’etat. Given that Sudan straddles the Nile and has access to the Red Sea, it increasingly came to be seen as a Cold War battleground. Nimeiri actively courted the Soviet Union and other communist states. He increased trade with the Eastern bloc and came to rely on Moscow for financing and armaments to wage the civil war. The government also moved to distinguish itself as an ardent supporter of the Arab cause against Israel, having broken relations with many Western countries after the Six-Day War. Israeli support for Anya-Nya peaked after al-Nimeiri brought Sudan into the Arab Federation with Egypt and Libya. Soviet military and financial assistance also peaked. Prospects for peace were dim.

A failed communist coup in July 1971, however, set in motion events that dramatically altered both Sudan’s domestic political landscape and its international alliances. Relations with the Soviet bloc deteriorated, while those with Western Europe, the United States, China and most of the Arab states improved. The Soviet Union terminated its support for the war effort. Without his largest military backer, Nimeiri came to see peace as more attractive than fighting an unpopular war backed by a weak army. With fragile domestic support, Nimeiri began to address the civil war and improve regional relations to bolster his hold on power.

In March 1971, he signed an agreement with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in which both leaders promised to cease assisting the other’s separatist movements. Later that year, Nimeiri signed an agreement with Ugandan dictator Idi Amin ending support of Ugandan rebels in exchange for similar action on the Anya Nya. Amin ejected the Israelis from

59 Op cit
Uganda, and the loss of external support devastated the Anya Nya’s war capabilities, forcing southern politicians to consider Nimeiri’s peace overtures in late 1971 and early 1972. With a monopoly of power, Nimeiri faced little opposition to ending the war in the south. This accelerated the peace process at a time when Anya-Nya was changing from a disparate group plagued by ethnic and personal rivalries into a more unified political force. Colonel Joseph Lagu seized authority in Anya-Nya, united its officers under his command, and declared the formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. The unity of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement/Anya-Nya proved invaluable in the peace negotiations that began at Addis Ababa in 1971.

Whereas the 1965 roundtable failed because southern representatives were split between those favouring secession or a federal system, a settlement was achieved this time because Lagu convinced his followers to accept Nimeiri’s proposal for peace “within the framework of one Sudan”. Ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement in March 1972 inaugurated a peaceful and cooperative era. The agreement included power-sharing and security guarantees for southerners and, most importantly, granted the south political and economic autonomy. Former Anya-Nya soldiers were to be included in the national army in proportion to the national population, and 6,000 southerners were to be recruited into the army’s Southern Command, an important security provision.

However, Sudan’s peace was short lived, as Nimeiri increasingly faced northern opposition to the Addis Agreement. With Libyan backing and support from the Ansar movement, whose supporters follow the strict teachings of the Mahdi (who ruled Sudan in the 1880s), the former Prime Minister, Sadq el Mahdi, unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the government in July 1976. The abortive coup had a profound effect on Nimeiri, who introduced a policy of national reconciliation in an attempt to win over the north and increase his political base. The process of national reconciliation led to the appointment of a number of opposition leaders to prominent government positions, including Mahdi. The majority of the Ansar and Muslim Brother exiles returned to Khartoum, and the leader of the Muslim Brothers, Hassan al-Turabi (Mahdi’s brother in-law), became attorney general. Southerners were squeezed out of the national political process, and the political landscape took on an increasingly Islamic tilt.

In 1977, Mahdi and a coalition of northern opposition parties demanded that Nimeiri review the Addis Agreement, especially its provisions for security, border trade, language, culture

61 ibid
63 Op cit
64 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter, 1990), p. 137.
65 An organisation composed of radical religious fundamentalists that would evolve into the National Islamic Front in the mid-1980s.
and religion, and Nimeiri appeased them by making unconstitutional revisions. The discovery of oil in the south also increased northern pressure to jettison the Addis Agreement, particularly those provisions allowing the south a degree of financial autonomy and the right to collect all central government taxes on industrial, commercial and agricultural activities in the region. Nimeiri conceded too many wishes of his increasingly hard-line cabinet and replaced southern troops with northerners at Bentiu, the site of extensive oil deposits. He personally pocketed proceeds from an oil licensing deal that the Addis Agreement stated should go to the regional government and discussed building a pipeline so that oil could be transported out of the south to the Red Sea for export or to northern refineries for processing. Though this never materialised due to SPLA military pressure, the intention to bypass the Addis Agreement and favour northern interests infuriated the south.

With southern grievances rising, Nimeiri became increasingly apprehensive that half of the Southern Command was controlled by former Anya-Nya. In January 1983, southern troops of the 105th battalion refused orders to abandon their weapons and be transferred north. They feared they would be sent to Iraq to join another Sudanese contingent fighting in that country’s war against Iran and leave the south vulnerable to an all-northern unit. After negotiations failed, Nimeiri ordered an attack on the insubordinate soldiers in May 1983. The southern unit fled, taking weapons and equipment and inspiring a succession of desertions and mutinies in the south throughout the year. The mutineers found sanctuary in Ethiopia, where they united to form the SPLA.

On 5 June 1983, Nimeiri issued “Republican Order Number One”, abrogating the Addis Agreement and returning regional powers to the central government. The Republican Order explicitly destroyed the south’s autonomy and carved it into three powerless administrative provinces. It transferred the south’s financial powers to the central government and declared Arabic, not English, the region’s official language. The order abandoned direct secret ballot elections for the Southern Regional Assembly and dissolved its power to veto central government law. It also cancelled the sections of the Addis Agreement that guaranteed local control of the armed forces in the south and transferred this responsibility to the central government. In addition to dramatically re-centralising political and economic power, Nimeiri officially transformed Sudan into an Islamic State, decreeing in September 1983 that sharia or Islamic law “be the sole guiding force behind the law of the Sudan”.

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67 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter, 1990), p. 175.
68 Ibid.
70 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter, 1990), p. 222.
72 Ibid.
Though one-third of the population was non-Muslim, Islamic penal codes were imposed on the entire country. Southerners were infuriated by abrogation of the Addis Agreement, and violent protest soon followed. Southerners mobilised around the SPLA, and John Garang emerged as its leader. Unlike the Anya-Nya, the SPLA defined its objectives more broadly than southern autonomy, arguing that all of Sudan needed to be transformed into a multi-racial, multi-religious and multiethnic democratic state. The success and overwhelming popularity of the SPLA in its first years is a testament to the scope of southern grievances. Once again Sudan’s government was changed by military coup, with Lieutenant General Sawar al-Dhahab ousting Nimeiri in 1985, and once again there was halting impetus toward peace. Popular pressure brought the SPLA and an alliance of professional and trade unions and political parties, including the Umma Party, together for peace talks. In 1986 they agreed to the Koka Dam Declaration, which called for a peace process spearheaded by a National Constitutional Conference. However, the Declaration was unable to resolve the contentious issue of sharia, which was left to a new incoming civilian government to be headed by Sadq al-Mahdi. Political and military turmoil persisted for several years as successive coalition governments headed by Mahdi were dissolved due to disagreements over economic, social and peace initiatives.

By June 1989, however, conditions favoured peace. The SPLA controlled almost the entire south and was exerting considerable military pressure on the government. The army calculated that it was in its best interest to cut losses and negotiate. John Garang recognised the SPLA would never win and that his strong tactical position would be best used to achieve favourable terms in negotiations. When Mahdi swiftly met its preconditions for a constitutional conference, the SPLA announced a cease-fire and reacted positively to the expulsion of hard-line National Islamic Front elements from the cabinet. Mahdi began to refer to the SPLA as an “armed movement” rather than “terrorists”. However, on 30 June 1989 Brigadier General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir seized power in a coup d’état and immediately cancelled all prior agreements, including the proposed constitutional conference. Bashir also acted quickly to consolidate his power and destroy the political opposition. He imposed a state of emergency and created the Revolutionary Command Council, which he chaired, to serve as a cabinet. It revoked the transitional constitution of 1985, abolished the parliament, banned political parties, detained all political party leaders and closed the newspapers. The leaders of student groups, unions, professional associations and political parties faced arbitrary arrest and disappeared in “ghost houses” and prisons where they were tortured or killed. The government also intensified the war. Despite rhetorically embracing calls for peace Bashir demonstrated little interest in serious negotiations. Two sessions, in Addis Ababa in August 1989 and in Nairobi in December 1989, failed, with Islamic law again a key sticking point. SPLA demands to revoke sharia were

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75 Political parties, not the government, issued the Koka Dam Declaration. The military was supportive of a peaceful settlement at the time but did not increase its advocacy for this objective until the 1989 coup.
78 Op cit.
anathema to the National Islamic Front - the Islamist political movement behind the Bashir coup - and the crackdown on opposition parties and non-governmental groups silenced some of the most forceful peace advocates.

Bashir, who had served in the south, promised new resources for the military and declared soldiers to be fighting as martyrs for the imposition of God’s law. He increasingly referred to pan-Arab and Islamist values when talking about the war in hopes of garnering support from Arab countries. Iraq soon sent arms, and the government revived its military agreement with Tripoli, bringing in Libyan armaments and oil.79 As the Gulf War took its toll on the assistance that Iraq could provide, Bashir turned to Iran. The SPLA, questioning President Bashir’s commitment to talks, also stepped up military efforts and forged ties with the National Democratic Alliance. The National Islamic Front government perceived Garang’s refusal to negotiate without strict preconditions as indicative of a commitment to resolve the conflict on the battlefield. The army vowed, “Not to give up one inch of the soil of this homeland”, and government officials rushed abroad to request funds to win back “Arab” towns captured by “Africans” and “infidels”.80 Garang and the SPLA did not recognise Bashir as president because the military coup had ousted a democratically elected leader, and they denounced the junta as “running dogs of Islamic fundamentalism”.81 In kind, government officials dismissed Garang as a communist and an agent of Ethiopia.82

From 1989 to 1992, security forces crushed several National Democratic Alliance and civil society uprisings in Khartoum, leaving the government to develop its policies on the civil war, sharia and foreign relations largely free from domestic political constraints. The military success of the SPLA in its first seven years was significant but it soon endured severe setbacks. In May 1991, the collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia deprived it of its main operating base, its primary military and financial supplier and most of its military momentum. The new provisional Ethiopian government, composed of various rebel groups backed by the Sudanese government, was hostile. The SPLA evacuated its military camps, and 200,000 Sudanese refugees were forced back into harm’s way on the battlefields of southern Sudan.83 In May 1991, the Sudanese air force bombed Sudanese refugees as they fled their camps in Ethiopia.84

Although the forced departure from Ethiopia placed tremendous strain on the SPLA, and Bashir expected the rebels to concede, Garang held fast.85 Several SPLA military leaders, however, began to seriously question Garang’s leadership. A major split erupted within the SPLA over the perceived lack of broad-based participation in its leadership. The fissure also

79 Ibid, p. 234.
80 Ibid
81 Ibid
82 Ibid
had an ethnic dimension, as the splinter group, SPLA-United led by Riak Machar, took most of the Nuer ethnic component with it. There was a history of tension between the Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups - the dominant groups in the SPLA - and the government sought to exacerbate the rift by providing aid and encouraging SPLA-United to attack its former compatriots. Within months, nearly 70 per cent of the Bor Dinka ethnic group in the southern Upper Nile region had been displaced, with thousands of civilians killed or wounded by the SPLA-United. Nuer communities felt the devastating repercussions from revenge raids by Garang’s SPLA.  

With bloodletting preoccupying the south, the government felt a military victory was tantalisingly close. Iran’s President Rafsanjani visited Khartoum in December 1991, declared the civil war a jihad and signed military protocols, including one promising to pay for U. S. $300 million in Chinese military material. The new weapons allowed the army to mount a forefront offensive in February 1992, and by mid-year the SPLA was on the defensive. The bloodshed and the SPLA’s decline led to a proliferation of third-party mediation attempts. Talks convened in Abuja, Nigeria from 26 May to 4 June 1992 with the government and both the SPLA and the SPLA-United attended. The government insisted that SPLA-United have its own delegation; in an effort to play the rebel factions against one another. The talks were doomed. The government came prepared to make no concessions because of its military success. The SPLA was in a weak bargaining position.

Though international pressure caused the Abuja talks to resume approximately a year later, the sides deadlocked again on the hot-button issues: religion and state; the political system and security during an interim period; socio-economic policies; and a referendum on self-determination. In 1994 Riak changed the name of his movement from SPLA-United to the Southern Sudan Independence Movement. Unable to secure weapons abroad, he increasingly turned to Khartoum to maintain his fight against Garang. Consequently, the fighting between Dinka and Nuer intensified. In April 1996, Riak and other former SPLA officers and politicians negotiated a “Peace Charter” with the government. A year later it was transformed into a formal “Peace Agreement” that offered vague promises that “a regional referendum on southern Sudanese independence would take place after an ‘interim period’ of four years in

88 Ibid
89 In fact, on 25 January 1992 Lam Akol of the SPLM-United signed an agreement with Dr. Ali al-Hajj Muhammad of the government in Frankfurt, Germany. The agreement lead to a cease-fire between the army and the SPLA-United, which allowed government forces to use land controlled by the dissident rebel group to attack SPLA positions. The government promised an interim period during which a referendum would be held so the people of the south could “freely choose the political and constitutional status that accords with their national aspirations without ruling out any option”. See Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Bloomington, 1998), p. 173. The government failed to follow through on all promises made to SPLA-United at Frankfurt.
exchange for Riak’s cooperation in merging his remaining forces with the national army”. Despite the bitter Dinka-Nuer divisions in the south throughout the mid-1990s, the SPLA increased contacts with the National Democratic Alliance, in a partnership based on a shared antipathy for the National Islamic Front government. This relationship made for strange bedfellows. In the late 1980s several of the allies had been adversaries, specifically when Sadq al-Mahdi prosecuted the war against the SPLA.

But Bashir’s crackdown on all opposition and introduction of jihad forced an alliance of necessity. Commitments were made to overthrow the government, hold a constitutional conference and establish a democratic government with the active participation of all members of the National Democratic Alliance. Though general principles were easily agreed, the details of an interim government and a constitution produced fierce debate and threatened to disband the loose alliance.

The SPLA feared that the northern parties had no interest in the south, were using the SPLA for its military strength and would retain Islamic law and revert to past behaviour once they overthrew Bashir. The northern parties were sceptical of the SPLA’s commitment to a unified Sudan. Some feared the SPLA would ultimately sign an agreement with the government that allowed for a separate south controlled by the SPLA, while conceeding the north to the National Islamic Front. Throughout the mid-1990s, the National Democratic Alliance sought a formula to reconcile the divergent visions of its secularists and its religious-based political parties. Underlying mistrust continued to prevent it from becoming a more substantial political threat. Nonetheless, it provided the SPLA with important northern and southern allies after its disastrous schism.

In March 1995 the Sudanese government bombed Ugandan territory, which prompted President Yoweri Museveni to break diplomatic relations and increase support for the SPLA. Sudan’s meddling in Eritrea and Ethiopia alienated those regimes, which consequently also began to help the rebels. The United States gave no direct assistance but provided the SPLA with moral and political support. Garang’s 1995 visit to the U. S. instilled him with confidence that the rebel movement was respected by the U. S. government - an important endorsement for any rebel group constantly in search of legitimacy. There was only a nominal change when Sudan’s government transformed itself in 1993 from a military to a civilian one. President Bashir ruled with behind-the-scenes help from Hassan al-Turabi and other National Islamic Front hard-liners. Bashir held elections for the first time in March 1996, although they were widely boycotted by the National Democratic Alliance political parties and other opposition groups and deemed illegitimate by most international observers. Not surprisingly, he won 75.7 per cent of the vote with only an estimated 7 to 15 per cent of

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eligible voters in Khartoum going to the polls.\textsuperscript{94} Turabi was elected unopposed Speaker of the National Assembly.

The entrenchment of National Islamic Front influence constrained the regime’s policy options to a degree. Bashir pursued the jihad with a vengeance, declaring, “The basic Islamic agenda of the regime will not change. Islam is the cornerstone of our policy.”\textsuperscript{95} This was a time of intense isolation for the government. Support for Iraq during the Gulf War, the extreme Islamist agenda and a policy of harbouring terrorists, including Osama bin Laden, alienated many former allies. In 1995 the SPLA mounted its first major offensive since its expulsion from Ethiopia and won a series of victories over the ensuing two years. In July 1997, under heavy military and sustained international pressure, the government finally agreed to negotiate on the basis of the IGAD Declaration of Principles.\textsuperscript{96} The environment of political repression and authoritarian rule continued throughout the 1990s. Late in the decade, a combination of military pressure and international isolation induced the government to institute cosmetic political and human rights reforms that led many in the international community to conclude that fundamental change was coming.

In May 1998, the government adopted a new constitution, which promised basic liberties, such as freedom of religion, freedom of association and self-determination for southern Sudan. However, these reforms were implemented in very limited, manipulative and politically controlled fashion. In December 1999 President Bashir declared a new state of emergency, dismissed Turabi as Speaker of Parliament, and dissolved that body only two days before it was to vote on a bill - crafted by Turabi - designed to reduce presidential powers.\textsuperscript{97}

5. Conclusion

The war in Sudan was caused by both economic and non-economic motives. It can be noted from this study that indeed, that war is caused by many factors. However, the most argued about cause of war is the economic agenda. For example, this study hypothetically argues that the economic agenda was a main cause of war in South Sudan. To begin with, the Government of Sudan was interested in the South due to the numerous oil deposits that are located there. That’s why, as observed by Prendergast, the Government of Sudan used helicopters and gunships to displace the southerners from oil rich areas. Consequently, any move towards self-determination would be uneconomical for the Government of Sudan. In addition, the Sudan war can be also be described as a war of visitors as various Governments supported the two warring parties. China and the Arabian states supported the Government while Uganda and Ethiopia supported the Rebel Group, SPLA.

\textsuperscript{94} Ann Mosely Lesch, \textit{The Sudan: Contested National Identities} (Bloomington, 1998), p. 125. In the highly controlled December 2000 election, the government won 270 out of 360 seats in parliament, a body that largely remains a rubber stamp for Bashir and the National Islamic Front party leadership.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.


From a conceptual point of view, the researcher agrees with the findings of De Soysa who claimed that the abundance of renewable and non-renewable resources is consistently associated with higher levels of conflict and lower levels of human and institutional development. It is noted that the findings of De Soysa, study support the argument that armed conflict is often driven by greed-motivated factors rather than grievance factors. In this case, it is observed that there are lot of renewable and non renewable resource in Southern Sudan such as oil. In addition, the River Nile passes across the vast land of Sudan not to mention the agriculturally rich Nuba Mountains.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the abundance rather than the scarcity of resources was the cause of the war. Meanwhile, the root cause of the war can be traced to the structural inequalities caused by the colonization of Sudan by two different masters with different political, social and economic systems. These phenomena led to the division of Sudan into two regions sharing different ideologies.

However, it is also noted that one of the fundamental cause of the Sudan War was the different faiths of the Northerners and Southerners. While the majority of the Southerners subscribed to the Christian faith, Majority of the Northerners were of Muslim faith. Consequently, Jihads (holy war) was a common phenomenon in an effort to convert the Christians Southerners into Muslims.

Other reasons such as the ethnicity and negative distributive consequences of humanitarian aid also contributed to the exacerbation of the war in Sudan.