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

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Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of executive compensation on risk taking among listed commercial banks in Kenya.

Methodology: The study used an Epistemology research philosophy, causal research design was adopted whereby panel data approach was used. The target population for this study were the 11 listed banks on the NSE. Secondary Data for the year 2010 to 2015 was collected from the NSE handbook. Data collected was analyzed using descriptive statistics which included means and standard deviations. Inferential statistics such as Pearson correlation and panel regression was also used. The results were presented in form of tables, figures, charts, graphs and trend lines.

Results: Based on the findings, the study concluded that there Share Ownership and risk taking are positively and insignificantly related. Regression analysis indicated that Executive Fixed Salary and risk taking were negatively and significantly related. Executive Allowances and risk taking were negatively and significantly related.Regression analysis results indicated that Executive Annual Bonuses and risk taking were negatively and significantly related. Based on the findings the study recommended that banks should pursue optimum compensation policies, which will ensure minimum cost to the bank.

Policy recommendation: This study recommends that on Executive Share Ownership banks should not increase director's shares as this will have no effect on risk taking. It was also recommended that banks might want to raise their executive salary bases on their executive staff as this will automatically lead to decreased risk in banks. The study recommended that banks should entice their staff with huge allowances as this will decrease risk. The study also recommends executive annual bonus should be considered incrementally while determining executive compensation perks as it has a decreasing effect on risk among banks listed on NSE.

Keywords: *executive share ownership, executive fixed salary, executive allowances, executive annual bonuses, risk taking*

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Executive compensation is presently one of the most interesting and innovative fields of research in the finance area. It was only in the 1990s, with the growth of the world economy, that shareholders felt the need to contract executives and give them incentives to make firms' stock market growth increasingly faster each year. Academics and researchers started searching for the best form of compensation to motivate these executives. It was not only the values that mattered, but also the way in which executives were paid: with more short term compensation (salary or bonus) or more long term compensation (stock options, restricted stocks, long-term incentives plans) or even with other forms of compensation like perks, and the impact of these compensation policies on all the fields of finance (Paolo, 2008).

Risk is a natural element of business and community life. It is a condition that raises the chance of losses/gains and the uncertain potential events which could manipulate the success of financial institutions (Crowe *et al*, 2009). Excessive risk-taking is viewed as a contributing factor to the market turmoil that erupted in the United States around mid-2007. Among the most frequently debated channels that have propagated the accumulation of risky exposures are ill-designed compensation policies, capital regulation, originate-to-distribute business model, low short-term interest rates, and others.

The bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2000 and the ensuing corporate scandals triggered a collapse of well-known companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia, resulting in massive destruction of shareholder wealth as well as damage to other stakeholders. The end of a housing bubble and the subprime debacle led to a shutdown of the credit markets and the failures of venerable financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch. The 2008 financial crisis spread rapidly around the world. These landmark episodes have drawn attention to the high levels of executive compensation, and to the possibility that the structure of executive pay plans may have contributed to the post-1990s bubbles, corporate scandals, and recent financial crisis (Michael et al. 2011).

When analyzing the relationship between firm risk taking and CEO compensation structure, it is important to keep in mind that conventional management compensation schemes motivates risk taking by only looking at return, without regard for the risk(s) accepted in generating it (Segerström, 2008). The same author then further argues that this incomplete approach regarding executive compensation can be seen as a reason for the subprime lending binge, which in retrospect has been identified as one partial cause for the financial meltdown during the recent financial crisis. Since the recent economic crisis originated primarily from the financial industry, and then in later stages developed into a more widespread economic crisis, it is the executive compensation practices in the financial sector that have been the most criticized (Segerström, 2008).

Core and Guay (2009) and Mehran and Rosenberg (2008) find various links between managerial compensation and financial firms' risk-taking behavior. Recently, the four-major federal bank regulatory agencies—the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)—jointly issued final guidance on incentive compensation. The goal of the guidance is to prevent two kinds of behavior by banks: pursuing short-term profits at the expense of the long-term

financial health of the organization, and taking imprudent or excessive risks that could jeopardize the safety and soundness of the organization (Jian, Kent and Todd, 2009).

In the Kenyan environment, the executive remuneration has not come under massive spotlight perhaps due to the nature of CEO compensation. The Kenyan Companies Act sets the general framework for financial accounting and reporting by all registered companies in Kenya, and stipulates the basic minimum requirements with regard to financial reporting. Due to the limited details of the Act, financial reporting and regulation are supplemented by pronouncements of the Institute of Certified Public Accountants Kenya (Barako, et al 2006).

Unlike in the US, where publicly listed firms are required to disclose information on top five executives' compensation, Kenyan listed firms have typically publicly disclosed only aggregated total compensation of a firm's board of directors. This compensation is limited to cash compensation as share option issues have not come into play yet as such the NSE disclosure on shares is limited to bonus and rights issues to the general investing public (Muriuki, 2005).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

A major criticism of executive pay packages has been that they incentivize excessive risk-taking which contribute to the financial turmoil. To respond to these concerns, governments and regulators have taken steps to restrict executive pay arrangements in regulated industries. However, there is still ongoing debate in the financial literature and among policymakers regarding how has executive pay contributed to bringing about the 2008 financial crisis, how to fix compensation structure and if pay structures should be reformed, what role if any should the government play in bringing about such reforms (Alon&Yoram,(2010).

Many studies when attempting to find causal relationships between CEO pay and risk taking find mixed evidence (Spitz-Oener, 2006). Mueller and Spitz-Oener (2006) examine 356 German financial service firms and find a link between pay and company risks in that a higher percentage of managerial ownership shares correlate positively with increases in firm risks. Lam and Chng (2006) find that managerial stock options correlate positively with firm risks. There are other studies (Sloan, 1993; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002; and Kerr &Bettis, 1987) that find a strong relationship between risk measures and executive compensation. Chesney *et al* (2012) find a strong negative relationship between the abnormal CEO compensation and excessive risk taking for the group of banks that do not report their Tier 1 ratio (predominantly, investment banks) Palia and Porter (2004) examine data for U.S. holding companies and find that the increases in salary and bonus components of managerial compensation were associated with lower risk. Duru (2005) demonstrate that the earning-based cash bonuses help to reduce risk-taking incentives of managers, whereas Hagendorff, *et al* (2015) find an empirical support to this idea, showing that higher bonuses entail a lower default risk.

Most studies in Kenya have concentrated on Executive Compensation and Ownership structure and Bank performance and not on the risk taking component. Such studies include Aduda (2011) who did a study on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the Kenyan banking sector. Asala (2012) did a study on the determinants of executive compensation in Kenya for firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. Mululu (2005) did a study on the relationship between board activity and firm performance of firms quoted on the Nairobi Stock Exchange.

This study intends to delve into how executive compensation influences the systematic risk among listed commercial banks in Kenya by evaluating how various compensation types; such as share ownership, fixed salary, allowances and annual bonuses affects the riskiness in the banks stocks.

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

In addressing the general objective, this study pursued the following specific objectives;

i. To Assess the effect of executive share ownership on risk taking among the listed commercial banks in Kenya
ii. To establish the effect of executive fixed salary on risk taking among the listed commercial banks in Kenya
iii. To determine the effect of other executive allowances on risk taking among the listed commercial banks in Kenya
iv. To examine the influence of executive annual bonuses on risk taking among listed commercial banks in Kenya

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical review

2.2.1 Principal Agent Theory

The principal-agent problem was first written about in the 1970s by theorists from the fields of economics and institutional theory. Michael Jensen of Harvard's Business School and William Meckling of the University of Rochester published a paper in 1976 outlining a theory of ownership structure that would be designed in such a way as to avoid what they defined as agency cost and its relationship to the issue of separation and control. These issues are central to the principal-agent problem. The separation of control occurs when a principal hires an agent, and the costs that the principal incurs while dealing with an agent can be defines as agency costs. These agency costs can come from setting up monetary or moral incentives set up to encourage the agent to act in a particular way.

A more widespread acceptance of the concept of agency costs and principal agent theory, formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) can be seen as the starting point for the modern executive compensation research. In short the agency theory identifies the separation between ownership (shareholders) and control (management) as the main reason to why executive compensation systems need to be designed such that they achieve an alignment of interests between the owners and the management of the firm. Related to this the following is argued; “The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976. p. 308). The principal agent theory has a strong focus on so-called agency costs, which can be seen as the driving factor for how the executive compensation system should be structured from a theoretical point of view. According to this theory the executive compensation system should be structured such that the agency costs that the shareholders have to bear, originating from differences in interests between the agents, are minimized.

Donaldson (1990) criticized the agency theory dominance in terms of methodology individualism, narrow-defined motivation model, regressive simplification, disregarding other research, ideological framework, organizational economics and corporate governance's defensiveness.



3.0 METHODOLOGY

The study used an Epistemology research philosophy, causal research design was adopted whereby panel data approach was used. The target population for this study were the 11 listed banks on the NSE. Secondary Data for the year 2010 to 2015 was collected from the NSE handbook. Data collected was analyzed using descriptive statistics which included means and standard deviations. Inferential statistics such as Pearson correlation and panel regression was also used. The results were presented in form of tables, figures, charts, graphs and trend lines.

4.0 RESULTS FINDINGS

4.1 Diagnostic tests

4.1.1 Multicollinearity Test

According to Field (2009) VIF values in excess of 10 is an indication of the presence of Multicollinearity. The results in Table 4.2 present variance inflation factors results and were established to be 1.26 which is less than 10 and thus according to Field (2009) indicates that there is no Multicollinearity.

Table 1: Multicollinearity Test

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
Executive Allowances	1.42	0.702867
Executive Fixed Salary	1.4	0.715789
Executive Share Ownership	1.14	0.877389
Executive Annual Bonus	1.08	0.93021
Mean VIF		1.26

4.1.2 Panel Unit Root Tests

Most economic variables are usually non-stationary in nature and prior to running a regression analysis. Unit root tests were thus conducted using the LLC test to establish whether the variables were stationary or non-stationary. The purpose of this is to avoid spurious regression results being obtained by using non-stationary series. Results in Table 4.3 indicated that all variables are stationary (i.e.absence of unit roots) at 5% level of significance.

Table 2: Unit Root

Variable Name	Statistic(Adjusted)	P-Value	Comment
Risk Taking	-6.51485	0.000	Stationary
Executive Share Ownership	-2.16193	0.0153	Stationary
Executive fixed Salary	-6.89990	0.000	Stationary
Executive Allowances	-1.66840	0.0476	Stationary
Executive Bonus	-3.50427	0.0002	Stationary

4.1.3 Heteroskedasticy Test

Modified wald test was used to test for heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis in the test is that error terms have a constant variance (i.e. should be Homoskedastic). The results in the Table 4.4 below indicate that the error terms are homoscedastic, given that the p-value is more than the 5% (0.07).

Table 3: Heteroskedastic Test

	Modified Wald test for group wise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model
	H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
chi2 (11) =	323.76
Prob>chi2 =	0.07

4.1.4 Normality Tests



Figure 2: Normality Distribution

To further verify the above results, Jarque-Bera test which is a more conclusive test than the graphical method was conducted. The results are as presented in table 4.5. The null hypothesis under this test is that the disturbances are not normally distributed. If the p-value is less than 0.05, the null of normality at the 5% level will be rejected. Given that the p-value is less than 5% for the residual, the null hypothesis is rejected and thus the conclusion that the residuals are normally distributed.

Table 4: Jarque-Bera test

	Risk taking	Exe.Share ownership	Exe Fixed salary	Executive allowances	Exe Annual bonuses
Jarque-Bera	7.870817	6.853443	5.349707	0.555680	3.180141
Probability	0.019538	0.032493	0.068917	0.757418	0.203911
Observations	61	61	61	61	61

4.3.5 Autocorrelation

To establish whether or not the residual is serially correlated over time, Wooldridge test for autocorrelation was conducted. The null hypothesis is that no first order serial /auto correlation

exists. The results are as indicated in Table 4.6 below and therefore the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is accepted and therefore residuals are not auto correlated (p-value=0.1010).

Table 5: Autocorrelation Tests

Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F(1, 30) = 2.864
Prob> F = 0.1010

4.2Exploratory Data analysis

Data analysis began with the exploration of the study data. Exploration study analysis examined heterogeneity across the firms and over time. Exploratory data analysis was done using graphs to examine the trend of risk taking within and across the firms. Figure 4.2 shows the empirical growth of risk taking over the 5 years. The empirical growth plot reveal that for most firm's risk taking trend has been on the fluctuating over time this could be attributed to environmental factors and the changing regulatory environment over this period.



Figure3 Exploratory Data Analysis

4.3 Correlation Analysis

Correlation coefficient values ranging between -1 and 1 measures the degree to which two variables are linearly related with the higher magnitude indicating higher degree of association

between two variables. Adejimi, Oyediran and Ogunsanmi (2011) observed that that a correlation coefficient of magnitude 0.3–0.5 shows a medium linear dependence between two variables while 0.5 to 1.0 shows a strong linear dependence.

The correlation results in Table 6 above indicate that executive share ownership was positively associated to risk taking among commercial banks listed in NSE (r= 0.061, p=0.638). Similarly, executive fixed salary, was negatively associated to risk taking (r=-0.097, p=0.456). Executive allowances were negatively associated to risk taking (r= -0.238, p=0.063). Also, executive annual bonuses had a negative association to risk taking (r= -0.486, p=0.0001).

Table 6: Correlation

Correlation

Probability	Risk Taking	Share Ownership	Fixed Salary	Allowances	Annual Bonuses
Risk Taking	1.000000				

Exe.Share Ownership	0.061340	1.000000			
	0.6386	-----			
Exe.Fixed Salary	-0.097039	0.323776	1.000000		
	0.4569	0.0109	-----		
Exe.Allowances	-0.238903	-0.270677	-0.495063	1.000000	
	0.0637	0.0349	0.0000	-----	
Exe.Annual Bonuses	-0.486013	0.033505	0.137091	-0.260706	1.000000
	0.0001	0.7977	0.2921	0.0424	-----

4.4Test for Fixed and Random Effects

When performing panel data analysis, one has to determine whether to run a fixed effects model or a random effects model. Whereas the fixed effect model assumes firm specific intercepts and captures effects of those variables which are specific to each firm and constant over time, the random effect model assumes that there is a single common intercept and it varies from firm to firm in a random manner (Baltagi, 2005). To determine which of these two models is appropriate, coefficients were estimated by both fixed and random effects. Haussmann's specification test (1978) was used to determine whether fixed or random effect should be used. Depending on the nature of αi , two models can be distinguished, first is the Random Effect Model which assumes that αi are random variables uncorrelated with vit. The second model is the Fixed Effects Model which assumes that the αi are individual fixed parameters. The results of both the random and fixed effects model are presented in the table 4.8 and table 4.9 respectively.

Table 7: Random Effects Model

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Exe. Share Ownership	-1.730807	0.940152	-1.840987	0.0729
LN_X1(-1)	1.746552	0.940653	1.856744	0.0705
Exe.Fixed Salary	-0.509771	0.242056	-2.106008	0.0414
LN_X2(-1)	0.046977	0.242663	0.193590	0.8475
Exe.Fixed Allowances	-0.340626	0.163437	-2.084148	0.0434
LN_X3(-1)	-0.208777	0.204147	-1.022680	0.3125
Exe.Annual Bonuses	-0.623036	0.350704	-1.776529	0.00831
LN_X4(-1)	-0.026215	0.348855	-0.075147	0.9405
C	-10.79776	1.831242	-5.896413	0.0000
	Effects Specification			
			S.D.	Rho
Cross-section random			0.262373	0.1012
Idiosyncratic random			0.781886	0.8988
	Weighted Statistics			
R-squared	0.400993	Mean dependent var		-2.572490
Adjusted R-squared	0.284114	S.D. dependent var		0.969457
S.E. of regression	0.807351	Sum squared resid		26.72446
F-statistic	3.430833	Durbin-Watson stat		1.885004
Prob(F-statistic)	0.004140			
	Unweighted Statistics			
R-squared	0.472655	Mean dependent var		-3.165766
Sum squared resid	28.70348	Durbin-Watson stat		1.755039

Table 8: Fixed Effects Model

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Share Ownership	-1.465951	1.592231	-0.920690	0.3643
Ln_X1(-1)	2.078906	1.539838	1.350081	0.1868
Exe.Fixed Salary	-0.749848	0.331873	-2.259440	0.0310
Ln_X2(-1)	-0.176179	0.304278	-0.579006	0.5668
Exe.Fixed Allowances	-0.298443	0.198314	-1.504902	0.1425
Ln_X3(-1)	0.055183	0.282628	0.195248	0.8465
Exe.Annual Bonuses	-0.118443	0.421348	-0.281104	0.7805
Ln_X4(-1)	0.281269	0.462907	0.607613	0.5479
C	-5.878363	14.22044	-0.413374	0.6822
	Effects Specification			

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

R-squared	0.651816	Mean dependent var	-3.165766
Adjusted R-squared	0.449645	S.D. dependent var	1.053954
S.E. of regression	0.781886	Akaike info criterion	2.627748
Sum squared resid	18.95171	Schwarz criterion	3.354317
Log likelihood	-46.69370	Hannan-Quinn criter.	2.904430
F-statistic	3.224078	Durbin-Watson stat	2.226267
Prob(F-statistic)	0.002056		

4.5.1 The Haussmann Test for Model Effect Estimation

The Hausman test was employed to determine the most suitable model for this study. The null hypothesis is that the fixed effect model is appropriate and the alternative hypothesis is that Random effect estimation models is suitable tested at 5% significance level. The Chi-square test statistic is 10.703576 with an insignificant probability of 0.2191 which means that the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the Random effects model. Therefore, we accept the random effects model as suitable for this study. The Haussmann test results were presented in table 9

Table 9: Haussmann test

Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test

Test cross-section random effects

Test Summary	Chi-Sq. Statistic	Chi-Sq. d.f.	Prob.
Cross-section random	10.703576	8	0.2191

4.7 Panel Regression Analysis

The regression model helps to explain the magnitude and direction of relationship between the variables of the study through the use of coefficients like the beta coefficient and the level of significance.

The results presented in table10 presented the fitness of model used of the regression model in explaining the study phenomena. Share ownership, executive fixed salary, executive allowance and executive annual bonuses were found to be satisfactory variables in explaining risk taking. This is supported by coefficient of determination also known as the R square of 40 %. This means that Share ownership, executive fixed salary, executive allowance and executive annual bonuses explain 40 % of the variations in the dependent variable which is risk taking. This results further means that the model applied to link the relationship of the variables was satisfactory.

In statistics significance testing the p-value indicates the level of relation of the independent variable to the dependent variable. If the significance number found is less than the critical value also known as the probability value (p) which is statistically set at 0.05, then the conclusion would be that the model is significant in explaining the relationship; else the model would be regarded as non-significant.

Table 10 provides the results on the analysis of the variance (ANOVA). The results indicate that the overall model was statistically significant. Further, the results imply that the independent variables are good predictors of performance. This was supported by a F-statistic 0f 3.430 and a p value (0.004) which was less than the conventional probability of 0.05 significance level.

The constant C had a coefficient of -10.8 with a significant probability value of 0.0000 which is significant at 1 percent level of significance. This therefore means that the independent variables jointly have a negative slope with beta.

4.7.1 Executive Share Ownership and risk taking

Table 4.11 provides Regression of coefficients results.Executive Share Ownership and risk taking are negatively and insignificant related (r = -1.73087, p=0.0729).Thus one unit increase in share ownership led to an insignificant decrease in the dependent variable denoted as risk taking by -1.73087 units.This seems to agree with Murphy (2012) who finds only little evidence that the pay structures provide incentives for risk-taking among top-level banking executives.

However, Houston and James (1995) disagrees as they found evidence for a positive and significant relationship between equity based incentives and the value of the bank's charter.Andersson and Fraser (1999) also disagrees as the results from their study provides evidence that managerial shareholdings, and therefore also indirectly the use of option based compensation, affect the risk taking level of banks.

As pointed out by Wright et al. (1996), shareholders with significant stakes in a company can shape the nature of its corporate risk-taking, which may affect a firm's ability to compete and eventually its survival. Excessive risk-taking by firms may result in massive bankruptcies, causing repercussion that are felt in the whole economy. This seems to disagree with our results.

4.7.2 Executive Fixed Salary and risk taking

Table 4.11 provides Regression of coefficients results. Executive Fixed Salary and risk taking are negatively and significantly related (r = -0.509771, p=0.0414). Thus an increase in one unit of executive salary led to a decrease of the dependent variable risk taking by 0.509771units.

Swagerman and Terpstra (2007) also agrees with our findings when they investigated executive pay structure in Netherlands, the study concluded that base pay is still an essential component of executive compensation due to its being risk free.

These results agree with Scholt and Smit (2012) who carried out a study on executive remuneration and company performance in South Africa. The study found that there was a strong relationship between executive remuneration and some company performance indicators, such as total assets, turnover and share price for companies listed on the AltX.

However the results disagree with , Gathua et al (2013) who examined the relationship between executive compensation and risk taking among commercial banks in Kenya, The study found

that executive compensation has insignificant relationship with risk taking among commercial banks in Kenya.

4.7.3 Executive Allowances and risk taking

Table 4.11 provides Regression of coefficients results .Executive Allowances and risk taking were negatively and significantly related (r=- -0.340626, p=0.0434), thus an increase in one unit of executive allowances led to a decrease of risk taking by 0.340626 units.

This mirrors Massa and Patgiri, (2009) whose Empirical evidence on fund performance suggests that higher incentives correlate with riskier investment strategies as well as with superior performance (Agarwalet al., 2009; Massa and Patgiri, 2009).

Garen (1994) disagrees with our results in that firms with higher levels of risk (as measured by betas from a regression of firms' return on the market return) paid their executives more in salary and less in incentive payments.

4.7.4 Executive Annual Bonuses and risk taking

Table 4.11 provides Regression of coefficients results .Executive Annual Bonuses and risk taking were negatively and significantly related (r=--0.623036, p=0.00831).Thus an increase in one unit of the dependent variable executive annual bonuses led to a decrease of risk taking by 0.623036 units.

This findings resonates with Thanassoulis (2012) who considers the effect of bankers' compensation structure on the banks' default probabilities. Bonuses are valuable as a risk-sharing tool, but a bank specific limit on the maximum share of bonuses of the balance sheet can reduce banks' default risk. Interestingly, he finds that stringent banker-specific bonus caps can also increase banks' default risk. In a subsequent paper, Thanassoulis (2014) argues that bonus caps can be a better regulatory device to reduce bank risk than a higher capital requirement, which would reduce bank lending to borrowers.

The Findings further agree with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) who shows that "banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis.

This agrees with Bruce et al. (2007) who carried out a study on executive bonuses and firm performance in the U.K. by investigating executive bonuses for the period 2001 to 2003. Their main finding demonstrated that executive bonuses are related to higher total shareholder returns.

Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) and Vallascas and Hagendor (2010) also agrees to our results that there is empirical evidence on the impact of bonus of top organizational leadership on risk taking, their study show that the higher the bonus the lower the default risk which demonstrate managerial effectiveness.

Table 11: Random Effects Model

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
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S.E. of regression	0.807351	Sum squared resid	26.72446
F-statistic	3.430833	Durbin-Watson stat	1.885004
Prob(F-statistic)	0.004140		

Unweighted Statistics

R-squared	0.472655	Mean dependent var	-3.165766
Sum squared resid	28.70348	Durbin-Watson stat	1.755039

$Y = \alpha + \beta 1X1 - \beta 2X2 - \beta 3X3 - \beta 4X4 + \varepsilon$

Where: Y = risk taking

α = the Y intercept;

x_1= executive share ownership

x_2= executive fixed salary

X_3 = executive allowances

X_4 = executive annual bonus

ε = error term which is assumed to be normal in distribution with mean zero and variance (б)

Overall model will be

Y = -10.79776 -1.730807executive share ownership -0.509771 executive fixed salary -0.340626 executive allowance

5.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of Findings

5.1.1 Executive Share Ownership

The first objective of the study was to assess the effect of executive share ownership on risk taking among the listed commercial banks in Kenya.

Regression analysis indicated Share Ownership and risk taking are negatively and insignificantly related. The hypothesis results indicated that there is an insignificant relationship between Share Ownership and risk takingamong the listed commercial banks in Kenya.

5.1.2 Executive Fixed Salary

The second objective of the study was to establish the effect of executive fixed salary on risk taking among the listed commercial banks in Kenya.

Regression analysis indicated that Executive Fixed Salary and risk taking were negatively and significantly related. The hypothesis results indicated that there is a significant relationship between executive fixed salaries on risk taking among the listed commercial banks in Kenya.

5.1.3 Executive Allowances

The third objective of the study was to determine the effect of other executive allowances on risk taking among the listed commercial banks in Kenya.

Regression analysis indicated that Executive Allowances and risk taking were negatively and significantly related. The hypothesis results indicated that there is a significant relationship between other executive allowances on risk taking among the listed commercial banks in Kenya.

5.1.4 Executive annual bonuses

The fourth objective of the study was to determine examine the influence of executive annual bonuses on risk taking among listed commercial banks in Kenya.

Regression analysis indicated that Executive Annual Bonuses and risk taking were negatively and significantly related. The hypothesis results indicated that there is a significant relationship between executive annual bonuses on risk taking among listed commercial banks in Kenya.

5.2 Conclusion of the Summary

The study concludes that Executive Share Ownership does not influences risk taking in that there is a positive relationship but insignificant. That means even if banks increase directors share ownership it will not have any effect on risk taking.

The study also concludes that there is a negative and significant relationship between executive fixed salary and risk taking. Thus, banks might want to raise their executive salary bases on their staff as this will automatically lead to decreased risk.

Banks might also be advised to increase the executive allowances of their executive staff as results show that executive allowances have a negative but significant effect on risk taking. Banks thus should entice their staff with huge allowances expecting a decrease in risk.

The study also concludes that executive annual bonus and risk taking have a negative and significant relationship. Thus, executive annual bonus should be increased so as to reduce risk.

5.3Recommendations of the Study

5.3.1 Executive Share Ownership

This study recommends that banks should not increase director's shares as this will have no effect on risk taking.

5.3.2 Executive Fixed Salary

It was recommended that banks might want to raise their executive salary bases on their executive staff as this will automatically lead to decreased risk in banks.

5.3.3 Executive Allowances

The study recommended that banks should entice their staff with huge allowances as this will decrease risk.

5.3.4 Executive Annual Bonuses

The study also recommends executive annual bonus should be considered incrementally while determining executive compensation perks as it has a decreasing effect on risk among banks listed on NSE.

5.4 Suggested Areas for Further Study

The study sought to assess the effect of executive compensation on risk taking among listed commercial banks in Kenya therefore, another area for further studies could consider the effect of executive compensation on risk taking among other sectors.

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